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A B S T R A C T   
Concurrent elections are widely used to increase turnout. We theorize and show empirically how concurrency 
affects electoral outcomes. First, concurrency increases turnout and thereby the participation of peripheral 
voters. Second, in combined elections, one electoral arena affects the other. In our case of majoritarian executive 
elections concurrent to proportional representation (PR) legislative elections, the centripetal tendency of 
majoritarian elections colors off to the concurrent PR race. Third, concurrency also entails spillovers of the in-
cumbency advantage of executive officeholders to the concurrent legislative race. Drawing on quasi-random 
variation in local election timing in Germany, we show that concurrency increases turnout as well as council 
votes for the incumbent mayor’s party and centrist parties more generally, with slightly more pronounced gains 
for the political left. As a consequence, concurrent elections consolidate party systems and political power by 
leading to less fragmented municipal councils and more unified local governments.   
1. Introduction 
Concurrent elections are a widely used tool to make electoral 
participation more convenient and efficient for citizens. For instance, in 
25 of the 33 OECD member states we can observe concurrency of elec-
tions at the national as well as sub-national level. Concurrency occurs 
when two elections of similar or different saliency, which could be 
elections for executive, legislative, special elections, or referendums, are 
held simultaneously. It is well established that concurrency brings voters 
to the polls that otherwise would have abstained. However, do these 
additional voters affect electoral outcomes in a systematic way? We 
study this question in the context of concurrent second-order elections, 
for which the turnout effect is particularly relevant,1 and for combina-
tions of proportional representation (PR) legislative and majoritarian 
executive elections.2 
The classical view is that electoral participation rates are high among 
socio-economically advantaged and low among disadvantaged citizens. 
From this, we could expect that a stimulus to turnout relates to relative 
increases in participation of the latter (Tingsten 1937; Lijphart 1997; 
Kogan et al., 2018). Then, left-of-center parties should also do better. 
Drawing on quasi-exogenous variation in institutional settings, this has 
been shown empirically in various contexts (for example, Bechtel et al., 
2016; Fowler 2013; Potrafke and Roesel 2020), also specifically for 
turnout increases from concurrency (Fowler 2015). However, numerous 
studies report findings that diverge from this pattern: turnout increases 
can also lead to mildly higher vote shares for minor as opposed to 
mainstream parties (Ferwerda 2014), more electoral support for the 
extreme ends of the political spectrum (Finseraas and Vernby 2014), 
more participation of well-off citizens (Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2016), or 
electoral benefits for the left but also centrist parties (Hodler et al., 
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1 A substantial turnout effect for low-salience elections is evident both when such an election is combined with a political contest of higher salience (see Geys 2006) 
and when it is combined with a contest of similarly low salience (Fauvelle-Aymar and François 2015; Garmann 2016; Leininger et al., 2018).  
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2015). We take from these findings that the consequences of turnout 
shocks depend on particular institutional settings. However, a nuanced 
and systematic assessment of how concurrent elections should influence 
turnout is lacking. 
Therefore, the first contribution of our article is a theoretical argu-
ment that systematizes three important features of concurrent elections 
and explains what effects they may have. The first feature of concur-
rency is the ensuing turnout shock, which affects the composition of the 
electorate and should increase the participation of peripheral voters – 
this should improve the electoral fortunes of left-wing parties and po-
sitions in line with Tingsten’s (1937) law (but see Finseraas and Vernby 
2014). The second feature of concurrent elections is that they frequently 
combine different electoral systems – in our case, we assess a combi-
nation of executive elections with majoritarian voting system and leg-
islative elections under a proportional represtentation system. We 
theorize that the two-party tendency of majoritarian elections colors off 
to a concurrent non-majoritarian race. Third, drawing on the in-
cumbency advantage (Lopes da Fonseca 2017) and coattail literature 
(Campbell 1960), we argue that the incumbency bonus in one race has 
electoral spillovers – parties of incumbent mayors profit in the concur-
rent race (cf. Hainmueller and Kern 2008). 
Our second contribution lies in providing credible causal evidence 
for the effect of simultaneous low-salience elections on electoral out-
comes. Given that election timing is usually politically determined and 
has low variation over time, evidence on the electoral effects of 
concurrency that can credibly deal with potential endogeneity is scarce. 
We are able to draw on a unique case in the German state of Lower 
Saxony, where we observe quasi-random variation in the combination of 
legislative (local council) and executive (mayoral) elections at the 
municipal level in three legislative periods. Idiosyncrasies in the intro-
duction of mayoral elections led to quasi-randomness in whether 
mayoral elections are on- or off-cycle with respect to council elections. 
Various balance, parallel trends, and placebo tests provide support for 
this assumption. In our case, concurrency leads to gains of centrist 
parties (around 1.2 percentage points) in general and incumbent parties 
in particular (around 1–2.5 percentage points, in tendency higher on the 
left side of the political spectrum). We thereby link to a literature that 
has extensively documented coattails from high-salience electoral con-
tests to concurrent low-salience races (Magar 2012; Campbell, 1987, 
1991; Ferejohn and Calvert 1984; DeNardo 1980). Here, we provide 
evidence that coattails are also a relevant feature of simultaneous 
low-salience elections, where the turnout shock is more moderate in 
size. Our results also demonstrate that coattails can occur in cases of 
horizontal concurrency (executive and legislative elections at the same 
level). In contrast, the existing literature on coattails has mostly focused 
on vertical concurrency (first-order executive and second-order legis-
lative or other elections) (e.g. Rogers 2019; Meredith 2013). Therefore, 
our argument and results should apply to a wide range of cases where we 
see concurrent executive and legislative elections, or concurrent elec-
tions with different electoral formulas more generally.3 
Our third contribution is that we show that these concurrency effects 
matter for representation. With centrist parties and incumbent parties 
(which mostly are centrist) profiting, we see a lower number of effective 
parliamentary parties, a higher likelihood of single-party dominance in 
local councils, and a higher likelihood of alignment of local council 
majorities and mayoral party affiliation with concurrency. In short, 
concurrent elections consolidate party systems and political power by 
producing less fragmented municipal councils and more unified local 
governments. 
2. Theoretical argument 
We start with the observation that a combination of elections in-
creases turnout. This effect is well-known and was already formulated in 
Boyd’s (1989) ballot attractiveness hypothesis (whereby turnout in-
creases if salient elections are added to a ballot). Since then, a broad 
literature has established that turnout increases in low-salience elections 
when they are held concurrent to high-salience elections (see Geys 2006 
for a review). However, and more relevant for our case, a recent liter-
ature provides evidence that concurrency is also causing an increase in 
turnout for the combination of two second-order elections, both simi-
larly low in salience (Fauvelle-Aymar and François 2015; Garmann 
2016; Leininger et al., 2018). Theoretically, this literature argues that 
with constant voting costs any additional ballot should increase the 
benefit of turning out for the electorate on average. However, it is likely 
that only part of the electorate, not necessarily the whole electorate, 
experiences this turnout stimulus. Hence, the composition of voters 
likely differs when an election is held concurrently compared to being 
held alone. In the following, we lay out why we would expect these 
concurrent elections not to be outcome neutral. 
We propose that an effect of concurrent elections on vote shares 
through higher turnout could stem from three mechanisms. First, con-
current elections have economies of scale to the individual voter (as at 
least some costs of voting are constant irrespective of the number of 
ballots). Hence, when concurrent elections reduce voting costs over 
benefits as such, this could lead to increased participation of peripheral 
voters. Arguably, voting costs matter more for socioeconomically 
disadvantaged citizens who (given their economic situation) should 
have a preference for left-wing parties. This is what drives the widely 
hypothesized relationship between lower turnout and more socioeco-
nomically biased electorates known as Tingsten’s (1937) law. 
Conversely, a relative decrease of voting costs should lead to more 
balanced participation, and electorally to benefits for the political left 
(see Bechtel et al. (2017), Fowler (2013, 2015), but Finseraas and 
Vernby (2014), Ferwerda (2014)). In our case, this is the center-left 
social-democratic SPD. 
In line with this argument, Kogan et al. (2018) show that when 
low-salience elections in the US are combined with high salience 
nation-wide elections, especially with presidential elections, the elec-
torate becomes more diverse and more liberal on aggregate. However, 
the relative increase of participation of peripheral voters with concur-
rency needs to be sufficiently large to make a meaningful difference to 
the overall voter composition (Kohler 2011). Hence, Kogan et al. (2018) 
also find that, when low-salience elections are combined with other 
low-salience elections, compositional effects are less pronounced. We 
therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 1. Concurrent second-order elections increase the partic-
ipation of peripheral voters and thereby provide electoral benefits to 
left-wing parties. 
Second, a simultaneous election brings with it a specific coattail ef-
fect that can but does not have to benefit the political left.4 In particular, 
each election brings with it mobilization efforts of individual parties and 
candidates. We draw upon a model by Cox (2015), who argues that 
concurrent elections allow parties that field candidates in separate races 
simultaneously to internalize positive externalities from mobilization in 
any individual electoral contest. Mobilizational alliances for different 
3 Some evidence in this direction can also be found in the literature on mixed 
electoral systems (e.g. Hainmueller and Kern 2008; Ferrara et al., 2005). 
4 By coattail effects we understand that institutional and other features of one 
government level affect election outcomes at another government level. 
Drawing on Meredith (2013: 742), this is the usage of the term coattail effect in 
the comparative politics literature, which is a bit broader than its usage in the 
American politics literature, where coattails usually refer to the effect that “the 
personal identity of a party’s candidate in one election has on the performance 
of the party’s candidates in concurrent elections”. 
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political seats under the same party brand increase the mobilization 
efforts of these political actors, and even more so with the number and 
value of the offices at stake. However, the model stays silent on how this 
could affect electoral outcomes on aggregate. 
We propose that the aggregate effects of mobilization depend on the 
electoral systems that are combined. In our case, we see the combination 
of a PR vote for local councils with a majoritarian election for the 
mayoral office. Only two parties can field viable candidates (usually the 
dominant centrist parties) for the majoritarian election (Cox 1997), will 
plausibly invest in mobilization efforts for these candidates, and will be 
seen as worthwhile to turn out for by voters. Consequently, the strength 
of mobilizational alliance varies over parties, with viable parties in the 
majoritarian election enjoying a mobilizational edge for the concurrent 
PR contest. Hence, the usual two-party concentration effect of majori-
tarian electoral contests should rub off to the concurrent PR election. 
This argument is related to the centripetal pressure towards a two-party 
system in the PR tier proposed by Duverger (1986: 72) for 
mixed-member systems that combine majoritarian with PR elections. 
We therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 2. Concurrent second-order elections that combine 
majoritarian and PR electoral systems lead to electoral benefits for 
centrist parties in the PR race. 
Third, we start by observing that incumbents hold electoral advan-
tages over competitors and propose that these extend to concurrent 
elections. As Dewan and Shepsle (2011) note, “the advantage of in-
cumbents in electoral contests is perhaps one of the best-documented 
empirical regularities in politics.” These electoral advantages may 
stem from scare-off effects for potential challengers, experience and 
resources attached to the office, or informational shortcuts that voters 
apply (see Lopes da Fonseca 2017). Irrespective of why these in-
cumbents enjoy an electoral advantage, we propose that the electoral 
benefit of incumbency is not restricted to personal reelection. In line 
with Hainmueller and Kern (2008), we argue that incumbents can 
attract additional votes for their party in a concurrent election. One 
potential mechanism for this runs through informational shortcuts that 
voters employ. De Benedictis-Kessner (2018) reports that the in-
cumbency advantage for mayors increases with national elections con-
current to mayoral elections, which he explains by uninformed voters 
coming to the poll and supporting an incumbent who’s name they 
recognize against a lesser-known challenger (see also Bracco and Revelli 
(2018), Rudolph (2017), but Trounstine (2013)). Beyond the personality 
of the incumbent mayor, similar effects may accrue to the party of the 
sitting mayor itself. For instance, relevant to our case, Freier (2015) 
identifies a persistent and strong party incumbency advantage in 
German municipal elections. 
We turn this argument around and propose that voters who support 
the incumbent mayor and are mobilized to vote for her are also more 
inclined to vote for her party in the concurrent election. This argument 
directly relates to the large literature on the coattails of executive office 
holders on concurrent legislative elections – such coattails provide a 
plausible pathway for an incumbency advantage to color off to a con-
current race (e.g. Halberstam and Montagnes 2015; Magar 2012), and is 
part of the explanation of the “surge” observed in votes for congressional 
candidates on a presidential party ticket in Campbell’s 1960 “surge and 
decline” argument. As most party incumbents (aside from independent 
candidates) are from CDU and SPD, we would again expect to see the 
two centrist parties profit on aggregate from these incumbency advan-
tages. We therefore propose: 
Hypothesis 3. Concurrent second-order elections that combine exec-
utive and legislative elections lead to electoral benefits for the parties of 
executive incumbents in the other race. 
Finally, we can derive expectations for the overall party system in 
council elections if all these hypotheses bear out. If one or both of the 
major parties profit, this will lead to a decrease in party system 
fragmentation and a greater likelihood of single-party majorities in the 
municipal council. Given that most mayoral incumbents come from one 
of the two major parties and that incumbents provide coattails to their 
party list, we should expect a greater likelihood of alignment of the 
incumbent mayors’ party and the party holding the council majority – 
we address this in more detail in the discussion. Having established our 
expectations for the empirical analysis, we proceed with a short 
description of our case before explaining our research design. 
3. Case 
Election timing can depend on strategic considerations of policy- 
makers (Anzia 2012a), such as future economic prospects (Smith 
2003), or anticipated feelings in the electorate (Lupia and Strom (1995); 
see also Hartney and Nickerson (2012); Kayser (2005); Meredith 
(2009)). This could well imply that unobserved variables correlate with 
our dependent variables (turnout levels and electoral outcomes), and 
our independent variable (the occurrence of a concurrent election). We 
therefore first describe our case – municipal council and mayoral elec-
tions in the German state of Lower Saxony – and how it provides us with 
credibly exogenous variation in the occurrence of concurrent mayoral 
elections (CMEs). 
We begin by briefly outlining the institutional setting under study. 
Municipalities are the lowest tier of government in Germany. However, 
they are of substantial political and economic importance, as they ac-
count for about a quarter of all total government spending.5 They are 
responsible for culture, sports, elementary schools, local public trans-
port, social welfare, and local infrastructure management, among 
others. Municipalities generate revenue through property and business 
taxes, which they set and collect themselves. In addition, municipalities 
receive a share of wage and income tax as well as VAT revenue. Finally, 
they also finance themselves through fees, rents, leases, and sales, as 
well as debt. To the extent that their own revenues are not sufficient, the 
state provides the necessary funds through an inter-municipality 
financial compensation mechanism. 
The state of Lower Saxony, with 47.600 km2 and 7.9 million in-
habitants, is Germany’s second-largest and fourth-most populous state. 
Lower Saxony comprises 414 municipalities with directly elected 
mayors.6 From this set of 414 municipalities, we exclude municipalities 
that have seen changes in their borders due to municipality mergers 
between 2001 and 2011. This leaves us with 401 municipalities, which 
remained unchanged throughout our period of investigation. 
Council elections in Lower Saxony are held every five years on the 
same date across the federal state. Voters have three votes, which they 
allocate freely to party list(s) or individual party candidate(s) in an 
open-list system with seat allocation proportional to vote share and no 
electoral threshold apart from the natural threshold defined by the seat 
allocation mechanism. Lower Saxony’s political spectrum, just as the 
national level, is dominated by two parties: the center-left SPD and the 
center-right CDU. In the council elections that we study, these two 
parties obtained the plurality of votes in 1121 out of 1203 elections. 
They also won 66.9% of mayoral elections between 2001 and 2011. 
Independents won almost all other elections. 
5 See http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situat 
ion-in-deutschland/61867/oeffentliche-finanzen, retrieved on 16/03/2017. 
6 Of these, 126 are so-called Samtgemeinden (collective municipal associa-
tions). A Samtgemeinde is an administrative division particular to Lower Saxony. 
It is an association of smaller municipalities that executes most municipal duties 
for its member municipalities (see Lower Saxony law on local government, 
NKomVG). Around 80% of municipalities in Lower Saxony have united to form 
Samtgemeinden. The remaining 288 are so-called Einheitsgemeinden, including 
124 cities (As of 01/01/2014, see http://www.mi.niedersachsen.de/themen 
/kommunen/kommunen-in-niedersachsen-63108.html, retrieved on 16/03/ 
2017). While the former tend to be more rural, the latter tend to be more urban. 
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In 1996, under SPD-party rule and contested by the opposition, the 
direct election of these local executives was introduced with five-year 
terms. Mayors were until then indirectly elected by the municipal 
council for 12-year terms and had a largely ceremonial and represen-
tative role. The municipal administration’s day-to-day business was 
overseen by a professional municipal director, who was appointed by 
the council. When the direct election of mayors was introduced in 1996, 
the position of municipal director ceased to exist. Elected mayors lead 
the municipal executive, which is a full-time appointment in Lower 
Saxony. They hold considerable sway over a municipality’s public 
administration. For instance, departmental heads of the city adminis-
tration are elected by the council on the recommendation by the mayor, 
who retains the exclusive right to nominate candidates. In contrast to 
mayors, council members retain their regular jobs and receive a modest 
allowance for serving on the council. 
In mayoral elections, voters have a single vote to give to one 
candidate. If no candidate receives an absolute majority of votes, a run- 
off election between the top two candidates is held a week after the first 
round.7 Turnout in municipal elections in Lower Saxony is relatively 
high when compared, for instance, to turnout in the US. On average, 
50%–60% of eligible citizens vote in local elections, with turnout being 
systematically higher when mayoral and council elections are held 
concurrently, as we show in this article. Even stand-alone mayoral 
elections draw almost half of the electorate to the voting booth. Turnout 
in these elections is on par with European elections turnout.8 
Next, we explain why the timing of mayoral elections has an exog-
enous component. Mayoral elections were to be held concurrently to 
council elections beginning in 1996 (Detjen 2000). However, transi-
tional rules did not force municipal executives to face reelection as long 
as their original 12-year term was still running (Armbrust 2007: 60f.). 
The reform thereby introduced a desynchronization of the timing of 
mayoral elections because some mayors (due to idiosyncratic reasons 
such as their age) chose to hold elections before their term ended, while 
others served out their full term. Note that in 1996, the term lengths of 
mayors was to a certain degree already on different trajectories 
depending on when the mayor in office at that time was elected by the 
municipal council, which would also influence a mayor’s decision 
whether to opt for concurrent mayoral elections in 1996. Additionally, 
in a second reform in 2005, under CDU rule and again contested by the 
opposition, the term length of mayors was prolonged to eight years 
(Armbrust 2007: 60f.). The explicit political aim of the reform was to 
desynchronize the electoral cycles of municipal executives and coun-
cils.9 This became effective for all mayoral elections from 2005. This 
reform pushed municipalities with concurrent elections out of concur-
rency and some into concurrency. Lastly, exceptional mayoral elections 
occur with the death, retirement, or resignation of mayors and lead to 
new terms, inducing additional desynchronization of council and 
mayoral elections.10 
We analyze the council elections of 2001 (9 September), 2006 (10 
September), and 2011 (11 September). On these dates, some 
municipalities in Lower Saxony concurrently elected their mayors while 
others did not do so because of the reasons outlined above.11 Fig. 1 il-
lustrates the variation in the timing of mayoral elections in our sample 
between 1997 and 2014. We see four broad patterns of timing that 
evolved: A first cluster of municipalities held mayoral elections in 2001, 
2006, and 2013 (denoted by symbol ◆ in Fig. 1), i.e., every five years 
and concurrently until 2006, and then with the new eight-year term in 
2013. A second cluster of municipalities held first direct mayoral elec-
tions before 2001, and then concurrently with local elections in 2006; 
they are therefore out of sync in 2001 and 2011 (□). A third cluster of 
municipalities held first direct mayoral elections after 2001, and then 
concurrently with local elections in 2011; they are therefore out of sync 
in 2001 and 2006 (■). A fourth, smaller cluster never held CMEs (○). 
Overall, 188 municipalities held CMEs in 2001, 110 did so in 2006, and 
249 did in 2011. 
Altogether, these patterns of (non-)concurrency that we observe 
depend on individual retirement decisions of mayors before 1996 that 
led to differences in running terms back then, as well as on reforms 
explicitly aimed at desynchronizing electoral cycles affecting different 
municipalities at different times. More importantly, because of these 
multiple reforms, we observe almost all municipalities both under 
treatment and control status for different elections – only 41 munici-
palities never held CMEs during our period of study, and only five al-
ways held CMEs. These circumstances provide plausibly exogenous 
variation for analyzing the effect of CMEs on electoral results for council 
Fig. 1. The figure presents one marker for each mayoral election since 1997 in 
362 (out of 401) municipalities in our sample. Vertical dashed lines indicate 
state-wide council elections in 2001, 2006 and 2011. If a marker overlaps the 
vertical dashed line, a municipality holds mayoral elections concurrently with 
council elections. We align municipalities along the y-axis by groups defined by 
patterns of concurrency: 156 municipalities held concurrent mayoral elections 
(CMEs) in 2001 and 2006 but not 2011 (◆), 105 held CMEs in 2006 only (□), 
60 held CMEs in 2011 only (■), 41 never held mayoral elections concurrent 
with council elections (○). 39 municipalities, which exhibit different patterns of 
concurrency, are omitted from the plot. See Fig. A.1 in the appendix for a 
visualization of concurrency patterns in all 401 municipalities. For an overview 
over concurrency patterns see also Table A.1 in the appendix. 
7 Electoral reforms by competing state governments led to the abolishment of 
run-offs between elections in November 2011 and 2013. However, this reform 
does not concern us because we focus on the first round of mayoral elections 
only. There are no second-round mayoral elections, which were concurrent 
with council elections. In cases where the ends of the council and mayoral terms 
coincided, the first-round of the mayoral election was held on the same day as 
the council election.  
8 See Leininger et al. (2018) who contrast turnout in 2014 European elections 
in Lower Saxony and turnout in mayoral run-off elections in the same year.  
9 In 2013, again under SPD rule, this prolongation and desynchronization 
were reversed by the new government (STK 2013).  
10 De-selection of municipal executives is rarely an issue. There are very high 
political hurdles; only two cases until 2008 are known where this occurred, see 
http://www.bpb.de/apuz/144111/politische-verfasstheit-der-kommunalen-e 
bene?p=all (last retrieved on 29 August 2020). 
11 Additionally, in some municipalities, county administrators were elected. 
Counties (Landkreise) are an administrative layer above municipalities with 
very limited competences. For this reason, we do not consider this variation 
explicitly in the following analysis. 
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elections. To substantiate this claim, we conduct a series of placebo tests, 
which we explain along with the research design described in the 
following section. 
4. Research design 
We draw on a perfectly balanced panel of 401 municipalities i for 
which we obtained data on three municipal council elections at points in 
time t = {2001,2006,2011}. Our main explanatory variable Cit is a 
dummy variable indicating whether a municipality i held concurrent 
mayoral elections (CMEs) at time t. We then estimate the effects of CMEs 
on three sets of dependent variables Yit . First, we regress turnout (ab-
solute number of voters in the council election relative to the voting- 
eligible population12) on our treatment dummy. Second, we move to 
electoral outcomes: we look at the vote share of the party holding the 
mayoralty at the time of the council election (‘incumbent party vote’), 
the combined vote share of the two large mainstream parties (‘major 
party vote’) as well as the vote share of individual parties at council 
elections (we consider the most important parties SPD, CDU, FDP and 
Greens, all represented in the state assembly, and a residual ‘other’ 
category). Third, we consider aggregate outcomes at the council level: a 
dummy variable indicating one-party majorities in the local council (i.e., 
a party with more than 50% of votes), Laakso and Tagepeera’s (1979) 
effective number of legislative parties, and a dummy variable indicating 
alignment of mayoralty and the party holding the plurality of council 
votes occurred.13 
We include time (θt) and unit (γi) fixed-effects in our regressions to 
control for common election-year shocks and time-constant confounders 
at the municipality level, clustering standard errors at the level of 
treatment, i.e., municipalities. Our estimation equation therefore is: 
Yit = θt + γi + βCit + εit . 
The empirical strategy builds on the assumption that had mayoral 
elections not occured, the outcome variables in ‘treated’ municipalities 
with CME would follow similar trends as in ‘untreated’ municipalities 
with stand-alone council elections. Hence, we rely on a difference-in- 
differences framework (Lechner 2011). The idiosyncrasies in the 
timing of mayoral elections described above make it highly likely that 
the assumptions of the design are met in our case. We conduct three sets 
of tests to justify this assumption: Parallel trends in the pre-treatment 
period, placebo tests on unrelated outcomes (federal and European 
election results) in the treatment period, and balance tests on potential 
confounders all indicate that our empirical strategy provides valid es-
timates of the causal effect of concurrency. 
First, we assess parallel trends in council elections in the pre- 
treatment period 1981 to 1991. We do this for the three most sizable 
clusters of municipalities based on their pattern of election timing in the 
treatment period, i.e. the top three panels of Fig. 1.14 As presented in 
Appendix Section A.2.1, these three groups exhibit very similar trends in 
turnout, major party vote shares or SPD/CDU vote shares. This indicates 
that we do not expect that municipalities selected into (early) concur-
rency based on turnout or vote share trends. 
Second, we conduct two types of placebo tests on federal and Euro-
pean elections in the treatment period 1998–2014: On the one hand, as 
reported in Appendix Section A.2.2, the three most sizable clusters of 
municipalities (see above) show very similar trends in turnout and 
electoral outcomes in the treatment period. On the other hand, we 
formally test for an effect of CME on turnout and electoral outcomes in 
temporally close federal and European parliament elections. While by 
definition, we cannot observe counterfactual outcomes directly, we 
capture through this analysis both minimum and maximum turnout 
potential in the municipalities as these elections represent the most 
salient as well as the least salient of elections in which German voters 
can vote.15 Regressing turnout and vote shares in federal and European 
parliament elections on our original treatment variable, concurrency of 
mayoral and council elections, we find differences between treatment 
and control group which are minuscule and statistically insignificant 
(see Appendix Section A.2.3).16 
Third, we conduct balance tests for several geographic, de-
mographic, and socio-economic control variables: Comparing means 
across all three election years and individually, we see differences be-
tween treated and control municipalities significant at or below the 5%- 
level in only five out of sixty comparisons.17 These results all serve to 
confirm that idiosyncratic events in the wake of the initial reform have 
set municipalities on a long-term trajectory of electoral timing. Later 
reforms affected all municipalities equally and provided no room for 
strategic election timing.18 Collectively, these tests imply that our esti-
mates have high internal validity. 
5. Results 
In the following, we present our results on how concurrent elections 
affect aggregate turnout and vote choice. Table 1 shows estimates for the 
average effect of CMEs on turnout, SPD, and CDU vote shares in council 
elections. Model 1 in Table 1 confirms the assumption, undergirding all 
our hypotheses, that concurrency raises turnout. Compared to an 
average control group observation, the treated municipalities see an 
increase in turnout of about 3 percentage points – an increase of 5.4% 
relative to average turnout in the control group municipalities.19 Our 
results are in line with what we would expect given earlier findings from 
concurrent local elections in France, Germany, and Japan, where effects 
range between 2 and 5 percentage points (Fauvelle-Aymar and François 
2015; Garmann 2016; Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2016). They confirm 
these prior findings that even two concurrent low-salience elections 
12 Registration is automatic in Germany.  
13 Summary statistics for these variables are provided in Appendix Table A.7.  
14 This is municipalities holding CME in 2001 and again in 2006, those only 
with CME in 2006, and those only with CME in 2011. We do this, as almost all 
municipalities are observed in treated and in control state in the three election 
years in the treatment period. 
15 Vetter (2015: 5) using German “Politbarometer” survey data shows that 
European elections are even less important to German citizens than local 
elections and that federal election trump all other elections in terms of 
importance.  
16 Interestingl mayoral elections held concurrently with federal or European 
elections do increase turnout in these elections. For the latter Leininger et al. 
(2018) show that this represents a strong causal effect of concurrent mayoral 
elections on turnout in European elections.  
17 See Appendix Table A.8. Balance also holds when comparing municipalities 
that hold CME for the first time with municipalities that still have not seen any 
CME (see Table A.10).  
18 Consequently, we observe differences, as expected, in indicators relevant for 
treatment assignment (see Appendix Table A.9). Incumbents’ time in office is 
higher in the treatment group, as mayors stepping down (mainly due to 
retirement age) lead to non-concurrent elections. However, concerning parti-
sanship SPD vs. CDU, mayoral incumbency is balanced in the overall sample. 
Note that SPD mayoral incumbents are more prevalent in earlier CME elections 
and CDU mayoral incumbents in later CME elections – this is, as the staggered 
reform process had incentives for SPD mayors to switch earlier and CDU mayors 
to switch later to CMEs. Similarly, although CME municipalities with CDU or 
SPD incumbents are broadly comparable, they do cluster somewhat 
geographically, and the center-right CDU is more dominant in more affluent 
areas (see Table A.11 in the appendix).  
19 Table A.14 in the appendix shows that a single election does not drive this 
average effect but that a sizable treatment effect occurs consistently for all 
instances of concurrency. These estimates remain substantively unchanged 
when we include additional control variables, giving further credibility to our 
design. 
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increase turnout.20 
To test our first hypothesis, Table 1 reports estimates for the SPD and 
CDU council vote in models 2 and 3. In line with Tingsten’s (1937) law, 
the political left (SPD) profits from CMEs. However, the political center 
profits more generally as we also see a positive but slightly less sub-
stantial effect for the center-right CDU. In model 2, the SPD’s vote share 
increases by about 0.73 percentage points, significant at the 5%-level, if 
mayoral elections are held concurrently. Model 3 estimates the corre-
sponding increase of the CDU council vote share to be slightly smaller, at 
about 0.47 percentage points, significant at the 10%-level. This increase 
in the vote for the two parties goes hand in hand with a corresponding 
decline for all other parties.21 The sum of both effects forms the ‘major 
party vote’ as reported in Table 2. 
Table 2 reports the central tests for our second and third hypotheses. 
Model 1 shows that concurrent elections increase combined center-left 
(SPD) and center-right (CDU) council election vote share (‘major party 
vote’) by about 1.2 percentage points. This provides evidence in support 
of our second hypothesis that with majoritarian elections concurrent to 
PR elections, centrist parties see electoral gains in the PR contest. Given 
that both major parties already win a vast majority of seats, the effect is 
relatively low at about 1.5% of an average control municipality. 
The dependent variable in model 2 of Table 2 is the vote share of the 
incumbent mayor’s party in the respective council race. Note that we 
have many independent candidates (about a third of the sample) – per 
definition, they have no corresponding political party in the council. We, 
therefore, exclude them from the analysis.22 Note also that we code 
party incumbency, not personal incumbency. In the case of Lower Sax-
ony that we analyze here, the effects for party and personal incumbency 
should be very similar because most mayors chose to run for re-election 
(Wollmann 2014). We also believe in erring on the side of caution by 
estimating the effect of party incumbency: a mayor rerunning likely has 
a slightly stronger effect than a party running a new candidate in cases of 
a mayor retiring. Hence, what we provided here is a conservative esti-
mate of the incumbency spillover effect. Still, results are in line with 
what we would expect from our third hypothesis: The council vote share 
of the incumbent mayor’s party increases with concurrency by about 
0.95 percentage points. Given a 46% baseline, this is about a 2% 
increase in control group vote shares. 
Table 3 provides detailed evidence on the coattails of mayoral in-
cumbents we propose with hypothesis 3. For this, we split the CME 
dummy variable to distinguish between CMEs with SPD and CDU in-
cumbents as well as incumbents from other national parties (FDP and 
Greens), and municipalities with independent or no elected in-
cumbents.23 Municipalities with SPD incumbents that hold CMEs see 
substantially larger increases in the SPD vote of around 2.2 percentage 
points compared to municipalities with non-SPD incumbents (model 1). 
While a similar pattern emerges for CDU incumbents, the effect is much 
smaller with 0.9 percentage points (model 2). For the SPD, the effect 
amounts to 6.4%, and for the CDU to 2.1% vis-à-vis their control group 
Table 1 
The effect of concurrent mayoral elections (CMEs) on turnout and the vote 
shares of CDU and SPD.   
(1) (2) (3) 







Year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ 
N 1203 1203 1203 
Municipalities 401 401 401 
Within R2  0.60 0.081 0.31 
Control group mean 56.3 34.8 41.4 
Control group SD 6.29 12.8 16.1 
Year and municipality fixed-effects estimation with standard errors clustered by 
municipality. ** (*,***) indicates p < 0.05 (0.1, 0.01). 
Table 2 
The effect of concurrent mayoral elections on major party vote share and 
incumbent mayor’s party vote share.   
(1) (2) 





Year fixed effects ✓ ✓ 
Municipality fixed effects ✓ ✓ 
N 1203 624 
Municipalities 401 291 
Within R2  0.34 0.20 
Control group mean 76.2 46.1 
Control group SD 15.7 14.8 
Year and municipality fixed-effects estimation with standard errors clustered by 
municipality. Major party vote is the combined vote share of SPD and CDU. 
Incumbent party vote is the vote share for the party of the incumbent mayor. 
This model is estimated on a reduced sample of municipalities, which excludes 
municipalities with independent (non-aligned) mayors and those lacking in-
formation on mayoral incumbency. ** (*,***) indicates p < 0.05 (0.1, 0.01). 
Table 3 
The effect of concurrent mayoral elections on party vote shares and turnout 
depending on party affiliation of the incumbent mayor.   













































Year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality fixed 
effects 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
N 1203 1203 1203 1203 
Municipalities 401 401 401 401 
Within R2  0.099 0.31 0.33 0.61 
Control group mean 34.8 41.4 9.90 56.3 
Control group SD 12.8 16.1 7.36 6.29 
Year and municipality fixed-effects estimation with standard errors clustered by 
municipality. Dependent variables are municipal council party vote shares or 
turnout, as given in model header. Independent variable is a split indicator of 
type of CME by party affiliation of the mayoral incumbent. Base category is a 
stand-alone, non-concurrent municipal council election. ** (*,***) indicates p <
0.05 (0.1, 0.01). 
20 Contrary to the even larger increases in turnout of about 11 percentage 
points (20%) observed with concurrent European and mayoral elections in 
Lower Saxony (Leininger et al., 2018), we suppose that council and mayoral 
elections attract a more similar sub-set of the electorate and therefore provide a 
somewhat lower stimulus to political participation.  
21 See Table A.15 in the appendix.  
22 We were able to obtain data on 907 incumbent mayors in total. Of these, 
314 are CDU (35%), 302 SPD (33%), 8 minor party (FDP or Greens) (1%) and 
283 independent (31%) mayors. 
23 Similar to major party vote, which captures the sum of the effects on SPD 
and CDU, Green/FDP vote captures the combined losses of both parties. As can 
be seen in Table A.15, both parties suffer equally from concurrency. 
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vote share. Note that we interpret these results as speaking for a genuine 
incumbency advantage mechanism because incumbency is only weakly 
related to local party strongholds, i.e., a party doing very well in these 
municipalities in other elections, too.24 Nevertheless, local party 
strongholds potentially constitute a relevant topic for further research 
into the effects of concurrency on electoral outcomes. Finally, for mu-
nicipalities with incumbents of the FDP or the Greens (model 3), a 
similar association evolves, with large effects of around 2.7 percentage 
points, significant at the 10%-level (note that there are very few of these 
cases). Incumbents of the other party have in tendency a small negative 
effect on a party’s vote share. Finally, model 4 of Table 3 reports 
whether mobilization differs by incumbency type. As can be seen, 
turnout increases relatively stronger with incumbents from FDP or 
Green party (around 4.8 percentage points) and least with independent/ 
no elected incumbents (around 2.9 percentage points). 
Note that the results also indicate that the benefits of concurrency to 
the two centrist parties are not driven by incumbency spillover effects 
alone. Instead, the political center also profits from CMEs where we 
would expect incumbency effects to be irrelevant, i.e., with independent 
or no elected incumbents. This finding is in line with the electoral- 
systems mechanism that we theorized: The turnout stimulus of concur-
rent elections under majority rule seems to induce centrist voters to turn 
out, as centrist parties are much more likely to field viable mayoral 
candidates in an average municipality. To summarize, both an electoral 
system and an incumbency mechanism contribute to gains for centrist 
parties when majoritarian executive and PR legislative elections are held 
simultaneously. 
6. Discussion 
Our theoretical framework laid out expectations regarding the con-
sequences of increasing turnout through concurrent elections, which we 
saw confirmed through our empirical analysis. First of all, we find a 
tendency towards a relatively stronger performance of the center-left 
SPD compared to the center-right CDU under concurrency. As both the 
SPD and the CDU hold about a third of mayoral seats and both parties 
compete at similarly high levels of political support,25 we would not 
expect this to be the consequence of a lop-sided distribution of mayoral 
incumbency. Rather, as proposed in hypothesis 1, Tingsten’s law seems 
to appear through the backdoor: Effects are consistent with either 
marginal voters being more on the left side of the political spectrum, or a 
larger mobilization potential of left-leaning marginal voters with con-
current elections. 
Second, we find evidence that the political center, not just the center- 
left, profits from concurrency. Both the SPD and the CDU see increases in 
their vote shares under concurrency. Importantly, these two parties also 
profit from concurrency in cases where independents or no elected in-
cumbents are in place, i.e., in cases where mayoral incumbency effects 
cannot be the driver of the vote share increase for major parties. This 
provides support for electoral system effects (as outlined in hypothesis 
2): A majoritarian contest concurrent with a PR race will lead to elec-
toral spillovers that impose the former’s two-party logic on the latter 
contest. 
Third, as proposed in hypothesis 3, we find clear evidence that the 
vote share of an incumbent mayor’s party is positively affected by 
concurrency – both when we look at incumbency coattail effects in 
aggregate, and when we assess party-specific incumbency coattails. 
These findings indicate that coattail effects are a general feature of 
concurrency. Note, however, that incumbents from the center-left SPD 
see stronger coattails compared to the center-right CDU. This implies 
that the size of coattails may depend on the relative voting costs of 
supporters of the incumbent mayor, the distribution of partisan leaning 
among marginal voters, or both. 
While we cannot exclude other mechanisms with our research 
design, we deem it likely that turnout is an essential part of the electoral 
effects observed with CMEs. Taking our mobilization estimate of on 
average three percentage points literally, an average control group 
municipality with 14,611 eligible citizens would see an increase in the 
voting population of 443 voters. If these additional 443 voters were to 
vote for the SPD exclusively, the party would see an increase in 3.3 
percentage points, which is about 4.5 times higher as our estimated 
coefficient (as not only the left profits from CMEs). However, the 
maximum increase of the major parties combined would be 1.2 per-
centage points, which is exactly what we find empirically. Finally, if all 
additional voters were to vote for the incumbent mayor’s party exclu-
sively, a vote share increase of 2.8 percentage points would follow, again 
larger than our estimate of 0.95 in Table 2, but only slightly larger than 
the decomposed effects for SPD/FDP/Green incumbents we find in 
Table 3. Overall, this makes sense as we would not expect a perfect 
relation between turnout increase and additional voters for the centrist 
or incumbent parties. 
In the following, we discuss the broader implications of our findings, 
drawing on additional evidence: Do concurrency-induced shifts in the 
electoral balance meaningfully affect local politics? A precondition for 
any effect of concurrency on policymaking would be a substantive shift 
in observed political competition at the municipality level. Therefore, 
we investigate how municipal councils’ composition and the alignment 
of legislative and executive majorities change through concurrency. 
Since coattails and electoral systems effects benefit the two dominant 
parties in our case, we should expect that concurrency reduces frag-
mentation in the council and, given the electoral strength of the parties, 
increases the occurrence of single-party majorities in the council. 
Coattails should also make it more likely for the mayor’s party to hold a 
plurality in the council. Making some additional simplifying assump-
tions that we explain below, we can conduct three empirical tests on 
these conjectures, the results of which we report in Table 4. 
Table 4 
The effect concurrent mayoral elections on the composition of local councils and 
the probability of unified government.   















Year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Municipality 
fixed effects 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
N 1203 1203 1062 
Municipalities 401 401 394 
Within R2  0.042 0.32 0.011 
Control group 
mean 
0.35 2.79 0.53 
Control group 
SD 
0.48 0.69 0.50 
Municipality fixed-effects models with standard errors clustered by municipal-
ity. Dependent variables are the probability of one party having an absolute 
majority in the municipal council (one-party dominance, model 1), the effective 
number of parliamentary parties in the municipal council (model 2), and the 
probability of one party commanding both a majority in the council and con-
trolling the mayoralty (executive-legislative alignment, model 3). ** (*,***) 
indicates p < 0.05 (0.1, 0.01). 
24 See Tables A.12 and A.13 in the appendix. 
25 The SPD receives 36% of the council vote on average, while the CDU re-
ceives 42%. 
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Our first dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether 
a single party list obtained more than 50% of the vote or not, which we 
then use as a proxy for single-party majorities in municipal councils.26 
As can be seen from model 1, results indicate that, with concurrency, 
municipalities are 4.3 percentage points more likely to have a one-party 
majority in the municipal council. This is a substantial increase (of 
12.3%) compared to the control group mean of 35%. 
Our second dependent variable is the effective number of parlia-
mentary parties (ENPP), which provides a measure of the number of 
parties weighted by their size (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).27 As ex-
pected, given the increasing vote share of the major parties, ENPP de-
creases. As can be seen from model 2, the decrease of about 0.06 is rather 
small compared to the control group mean of 2.8 effective parties. 
Nevertheless, findings are still in line with our electoral system hy-
pothesis. Concurrency benefits the two dominant parties and thereby 
reduces fragmentation. Our third and last dependent variable is an in-
dicator of partisan alignment between legislature and executive. We 
construct a dummy that equals one if the party receiving a plurality of 
the votes and the mayoral party coincide after a council election, and 
zero otherwise. Concurrent elections raise the probability that this oc-
curs. As can be seen from model 3, concurrency raises the likelihood of 
alignment by 6.8 percentage points (or 13% compared to the control 
group mean of 53%). 
Collectively, these findings provide a clear indication that concurrent 
elections likely influence both politics and policy. The combination of 
PR and mayoral elections shifts the balance of power in the municipality 
legislatures in the direction of the executive leadership, the mayor, as 
one would expected based on Campbell’s (1960) “surge and decline” 
argument. In the case of multiparty systems, this leads to a consolidation 
of the party system in favor of the center-left and also to a lesser extent 
the center-right party. 
7. Conclusion 
Elections are often held concurrently to raise turnout. However, the 
electoral consequences of concurrent elections, in particular when it 
comes to horizontal concurrency and concurrency of different electoral 
systems, are still underexplored. We put forward a theoretical argument 
that generalizes and extends the turnout effects of Campbell’s (1960) 
“surge and decline” hypothesis to PR systems. We argue that elections 
under a majoritarian system held concurrently to elections under a 
system of (party-list) proportional representation affect the outcome of 
the latter contest. We propose that both electoral system effects and 
incumbent coattails lead to electoral gains for centrist parties in general 
as well as gains for the party of the incumbent in the legislative race. 
This is because these parties are dominant in the majoritarian arena and 
the two-party tendency of majoritarian elections spills over to the con-
current PR election. Additionally, incumbents mobilize their latent 
supporters to turn out in higher numbers for the concurrent election. 
Drawing on a unique case in Germany, where we observe quasi- 
random variation in the timing of local executive and legislative elec-
tions, we show that combined elections increase turnout, even though 
both elections – municipal elections in our case – are at a low level of 
salience. This turnout increase affects the composition of the electorate 
and, thereby, who wins. While we find that electoral gains are slightly 
more pronounced for the center-left, we nevertheless find significant 
gains for the center-right as well. In line with our theoretical argument, 
concurrency also leads to a particular increase in the PR votes of the 
incumbent mayor’s party. Our findings relate to the broader literature 
that shows conflicting electoral effects of turnout, likely due to different 
contexts and institutional settings in which variation in turnout is 
observed (e.g. Bechtel et al., 2016; Cepaluni and Hidalgo 2016; Fer-
werda 2014; Finseraas and Vernby 2014). Although we cannot ascertain 
with certainty the extent to which concurrency affects electoral out-
comes (only) through turnout, the effects we observe are in line with 
what we would expect from a turnout-driven effect. 
Nevertheless, explicitly disentangling contamination from turnout 
effects is the first of four distinct theoretical and empirical challenges, 
which future research should address. Campbell’s (1960) “surge and 
decline” argument entails two propositions. On the one hand, it has been 
argued that mobilization efforts matter for electoral outcomes in con-
current elections (Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2016), which is also the 
theoretical argument we focus on in this article. On the other hand, core 
voters may change their minds, i.e., we observe contamination by which 
the characteristics of candidates for one vote feed into the decision 
making calculus of the other vote (Hainmueller and Kern 2008). While 
aggregate predictions on the consequences of concurrency do not differ, 
future research on the exact mechanisms would inform theories of 
voting behavior. For such research on who exactly is mobilized by 
concurrency, individual-level survey data of voters and non-voters in 
comparable voting districts with and without concurrency would be a 
crucial prerequisite. 
Second, how do concurrent legislative elections affect competition in 
the mayoral race? To the best of our knowledge, there is no research on 
whether concurrent elections increase the likelihood that parties field 
candidates or whether it increases the competitiveness of mayoral 
elections. Note that these effects can, in a causal framework, only be 
identified with a case where the researcher observes variation in the 
occurrence of concurrent legislative elections while mayoral elections 
take place in all municipalities at the same time, i.e., inverting the 
characteristics of our set-up. 
Third, do concurrent elections affect policy-making? A growing 
literature investigates the policy consequences of institutional designs 
that affect turnout. All in all, conflicting arguments have been made in 
the literature, from the introduction of postal voting, where increasing 
turnout brought lower welfare spending (see Hodler et al., 2015), to 
compulsory voting, where increasing turnout brought higher welfare 
spending (see Fowler 2013). So far, only few articles have looked at the 
policy consequences of concurrently elected political representatives, 
and with conflicting results (Anzia 2012b; Berry and Gersen 2011).28 
Fourth, do we observe heterogeneity in average treatment effects and 
the importance of the mechanisms leading to it when the electoral 
stimulus provided by concurrent elections increases? Even concurrency 
in low salience elections can have vastly differing turnout effects, 
depending on the type of elections that are combined (Leininger et al., 
2018). As reported by Kogan et al. (2018), for a given low-salience 
election, the change in the composition of the electorate is more sub-
stantial when the concurrent election is of higher salience and most 
pronounced with first-order national elections. Hence, we would expect 
that the relative importance of the electoral participation of peripheral 
voters, spillovers of incumbency, and differential mobilization from the 
electoral system also changes with the extent of the turnout stimulus 
provided by concurrency. In particular, we would expect that the 
equality-enhancing effect of concurrent elections via increased partici-
pation of disadvantaged voters, and a corresponding increase in leftist 
party vote shares, least traceable in our case, is more pronounced with a 
stronger electoral stimulus (but see Rudolph 2020; Finseraas and Vernby 
2014), whereas the incumbency spillover and electoral system effects 
are more pronounced when the electoral stimulus is lower, and the 
elections combined are of similar salience. 
26 This is a conservative approach to such majorities, as the natural threshold 
imposed by the seat distribution system implies that vote shares of less than 
50% regularly suffice for a council majority.  
27 For practical reasons, we simplify the approach somewhat. As we do not 
have data on seat shares, we use the PR vote shares. Parties other than CDU, 
SPD, Greens, FDP, Left, and Independents, which usually see only a fraction of 
the vote, are subsumed in an ‘Others’ category. 28 See also Kogan et al. (2018) for evidence from concurrent referendums. 
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Gaining a better understanding of the implications of concurrent 
elections is essential: While the turnout increase induced by concurrency 
is generally considered desirable (Lijphart, 1997), it is not 
outcome-neutral but seems to rest strongly on the nature of concurrency. 
Hence, concurrency has potentially significant implications for 
accountability, representation, and the structure of the party system. For 
instance, the incumbency advantage is widely considered as problematic 
for accountability because it reduces turnover (Ansolabehere and Gerber 
1997). Concurrency extends the incumbency advantage to another 
electoral arena. Even if the incumbency effect would only reflect 
candidate quality (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008), a spillover 
implies an undeserved electoral gain in an unrelated electoral contest 
and biases electoral selection in this contest. As shown by de 
Benedictis-Kessner (2018), concurrent elections can even cement the 
incumbency advantage of mayors, with a potential of reinforcing cycles. 
Note, however, that further research is needed to assess whether this is 
also detrimental to voter welfare (Prato and Wolton 2018). Neverthe-
less, one may also consider some of the effects of concurrent majori-
tarian and PR elections as positive. For instance, one may approve of the 
centripetal electoral system effect because it reduces fragmentation in 
the legislature. After all, fragmentation is particularly strong at the local 
level and in low-salience elections more generally. Overall, the electoral 
consequences we document ultimately bear implications for policy 
outcomes as well. For instance, in cases of horizontal concurrency, the 
partisan alignment of executive and legislature becomes more likely, 
which potentially allows the governing party to govern more effectively, 
also enhancing its accountability via voters (due to greater clarity of 
responsibility under unified government) (Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Wu 
and Huang 2007). Future research along the four lines of inquiry that we 
have proposed above should help to better understand the broader im-
plications of the often-used tool of concurrency for democracy. 
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